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Introduction
In the global political scandal that became known as the Iran-Contra Affair, various American diplomats were caught secretly and illegally selling weapons to Iran and using those funds to support anti-communist militias in Nicaragua. On the 9 th of July 1987, Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North gave his opening statement to the Joint Iran-Contra
Congressional Committee in the first of many televised hearings that would follow:
One thing is, I think, for certain: that you will not investigate yourselves in this matter. There is not much chance that you will conclude at the end of these hearings that… the Administration acted properly by trying to sustain the freedom fighters in Nicaragua when they were abandoned. And you are not likely to conclude by commending the President of the United States, who tried valiantly to recover our citizens and achieve an opening with strategically vital Iran. I would not be frank with you if I did not admit that the last several months have been very difficult for me and my family. It has been difficult to be on the front pages of every newspaper in the land day after day, to be the lead story on national television day after day, to be photographed thousands of times by bands of photographers, who chase us around since November just because my name arose at the hearings… But I am going to walk from here with my head high and my shoulders straight because I am proud of what we accomplished. I am proud of the efforts that we made. And I am proud of the fight that we fought. I am proud of serving in the Administration of a great President.
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This speech perfectly personifies the discourse in which the Iran-Contra affair has been embedded, featuring a flawed but noble character willing to break the law in order to prove his unshakeable dedication to his country and president. The Iran-Contra affair is usually followed by parentheses that state '(1985-1987) ,' as if to suggest that the scandal had no significant background prior to 1985 or repercussions after 1987. It has largely been treated as an American domestic political scandal that was uncovered in the mid-1980s and then solved by the Congressional hearings of 1987. This perspective not only ignores the military and political ramifications of the affair in Nicaragua and Iran, but also omits one of the most Smith 6 a bloody six-year guerrilla war. This contributed to a temporary expulsion of American troops in 1933. 8 Sandino's victory immortalised him throughout Latin America as a symbol of resistance against American imperialism. 9 His grand reputation was not only due to his military prowess, but also due to his economically modest background as a 'common man.'
Sandino's speeches were widely circulated, especially in Mexico, and paintings of his stories were romanticised by artists throughout the region. This inspiration carried on into the 1970s where the Sandinistas would name their organisation after Sandino.
However, Sandino's victory was short lived; he was assassinated in 1934 by pro-US rebels armed with American guns. 10 Sandino was replaced by General Anastasio Somoza
Garcia whose National Guards came to power in 1936. 11 Somoza, nicknamed El Yanqui for his Philadelphia bred English, was seen by the majority of Nicaraguans as an American puppet and despot. 12 His political opponents were subjected to electrical shocks, repeated near-drownings, imprisonment in coffin-sized cells, or incarceration in the Somoza's personal zoo alongside lions and panthers. 13 In 1956 he declared "I'll give this country peace, if I have to shoot every other man in Nicaragua to get it." 14 Somoza's successors, first his brother and then his son, proved to be just as brutal and pro-American. Somoza Debayle declared that he was more comfortable speaking English than Spanish and that he knew "the 8 American troops were already scheduled to pull out in 1933, but Sandino's constant fighting against the US presence gave his supporters the impression that he was the primary reason why the US retreated. Lebanon was now a battleground between Israel, the US, and Hezbollah, the PLO, Syria, and
Iran. 81 The Israelis and Americans were overwhelmingly concerned with the future of the region's stability and both decided that covert operations would work better than direct military interventions.
Israeli incentives to partake in Iran-Contra There were two primary incentives for Israel to partake in the Iran-Contra Affair. The first was to maintain the balance of power between Iran and Iraq so that neither country could pose a threat to Israel. 82 There are two other commonly used arguments that attempt to explain Israeli incentives to participate in IranContra but have been debunked by the majority of historians. The first was that the Sandinistas supported the PLO, however the Sandinistas ability to influence the PLO was extremely minimal and the greatest support that the Sandinistas provided was simply decolonisation rhetoric. The second was that the Sandinistas were antiSemitic, however this claim was mostly fabricated by American politicians in order to justify selling weapons to the Contras. This situation is loaded with imponderables that call for great caution on our part... fraud that seems to accompany so many deals involving arms and Iran and the complications arising from our 'blessing' an Israel-Iran relationship where Israel's interests and ours are not necessarily the same." Israel was effectively able to scrap a plan heavily supported by the United States because Israeli officials were not convinced it would serve their own domestic and international goals.
In late 1982, General Gustavo Alvarez, the head of the Honduran armed forces, 173 Miami Herald, April 29, 1984. 174 "An Israeli Connection?" Time, May 7, 1984, p. 75. 175 Houston Chronicle, October 8, 1985 . 176 Washington Post, October 8, 1985 Smith 41 information in 1986 while the Israeli public was exposed to the allegations in small doses spread throughout the 1980s.
Conclusion
Israeli agency in the Iran-Contra affair was demonstrated by its long standing histories in Nicaragua and Iran, its independent ambitions in these regions, and its ability to ignore the most powerful country in the world. Iran, Nicaragua, and arms deals, Israel acted more like a non-aligned country than one fighting the American war against communism.
Israel was an American ally; but it also independently pursued its own ambitions.
The myth of Cold War bipolarism and the complexities of international arms deals can be deconstructed by understanding Israel's agency and the major role it played during the IranContra affair.
